Planning Practice & Research, Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 311-318, 1998

~

CARFAX

PRACTICE FORUM

The Potential for Planning an
Industrial Cluster in Barre, Vermont:
A Case of 'Hard-Rock' Resistance in
the Granite Industry
ZENIA KOTVAL & JOHN MULLIN

Introduction
Throughout the world, there has been considerable interest among economic planners concerning the creation of industrial clusters
(Harrison. 1992, 1994). Efforts to stimulate,
nurture and reinforce such clusters can be
found in virtually all of the European nations,
as well as in Japan, Korea, China and others
(Malecki, 199]; Best, ]990). These efforts
range from reinforcing the strengths of promising areas to stimulating the creation of totaJly
new technologies (Castells & Hall, ] 99/i";. The
identification of such clustering oppon:.mities
has become a critical element of national, state,
regional and local planning activities. While
there are many researchers who have focused
on this topic, the Harvard Business School's
Michael Porter has, arguably, been among the
most effective in bringing the idea to working
planners in both Europe and the US. His books
and articles are widely read and analysed on
both sides of the At]antic and his ideas have
become increasingly commonplace in mainstream planning for economic development. Of
particular note is his work The Competitive
Advantage of Nations (Porter, 1990). It remains
to be seen, however. what happens when one
attempts
to implement
Porter's
principles
through local planning.
A glimpse at what happened in Barre, Ver-

mont between September 1994 and February
] 995' could help answer that question. From
September ]994, the authors were part of a
team of scholars and practising planners, commissioned by the mayor and the city administration to conceptualise
and prepare
an
e~onomic development plan for the city. We
worked with more than ] 00 local citizens,
business leaders, community leaders and trade
group representatives,
to develop a plan that
was largely based upon Porter's concepts.
This paper is a summary and analysis of the
team's efforts. While one case study cannot
conclusively determine anything, we hope to
help clarify issues for similar economic development planning in other areas, and to contribute to research into the effecliveness of the
Porter approach.

The Concept of Industrial

Clustering

The notion of places, regions and even nations
acquiring a comparative advantage due to certain industrial sectors clustering together is not
new. The first theorist to examine comparative
advantage was the eighteenth-century
Br!tish
economist David Ricardo. who studied the interrelations between growing capitalist markets,
trade and regional or national patterns of econ-
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omic specialisation. In his conception, comparative advantage renects the distribution of natural resources,
climate,
labour
costs and
differences in technology embodied in the production process. By the nineteenth century,
neoclassical theory, emphasising the nature of
demand and marginal costs and benefits, overshadowed classical theories centred around the
labour theory of value. The neoclassical theory
of comparative advantage includes more than
one factor of production, i.e. capital as well as
labour, and allows for the incorporali.on of
demand, which Ricardo ignored (Walsh &
Gram, 1980).
Industrial clusters have been identified In
Europe for generations-machining
steel in
Sheffield, textiles around Prato in Italy, chemicals along the Rhine, automobiles in the southwest German state of Baden- Wurtlemberg,
financial services in London and fashion design
in Paris and Milan. The most notable clusters in
the US arc the electronics industry in the Route
128 area around Boston and the computer industry in California's Silicon Valley. Industrial
clusters are emerging around medical devices
(Minneapolis),
biotechnology
(San Diego.
Worcester,
Massachusetts),
semiconductors
(Austin) and software (SeattlclPortland).
Over the past decade, industrial policy experts have come to realise that a positive local
environment is essential in developing global
competitiveness. The interaction of peers, competitors, local universities and the local government is crucial for the long-tern1 success of a
firm. Scholars such as Annallee Saxenian

firms to help upgrade the technical capabilitie1
of their smaller suppliers.
After analysing components of effective in·
dustrial clusters in the US and abroad, Michae
Porter developed the 'Diamond'
model fOI
competitive industrial clusters. He identifiee
four important aspects of economic activity tha
are essential to a strong industrial base. The
first relates to 'Factor Conditions'. It is here
that the role of government and local institu·
tions makes a difference. In order for loca'
industry to succeed it must have the cooper·
ation of local government. Government mus:
provide the water, sewer, highway and telecom·
munications systems that enable companies te
compete. Government must also playa key role
in training the workforce. For example, the
plastics cluster in Fitchburg/Leominster.
Mas·
sachusells has used the services of the Univer·
sity. of Massachusells (Amherst) for assistance
in dealing with chemical compounds (poly·
mers) and the University of MassachusetH
(Lowell) for assistance on the shop noor.
The second clement of Porter's model cen·
tres on 'Demand Conditions'. These relate to
<

(1994) agree that regions offcr :l competitive
advantage to certain industrial clusters even as
production and markets become increasingly
global in nature. That proximity promotes repeated interaction and the mutual trust needed
\0 sustain collaboration
and enhance techno-

growing national (or local, but not inler·
national) demand and market for products
Porter's model requires more than increasing
output based on having the cheapest product; i'
requires producers and buyers \0 work togethel
\0 insure that price. quality and efficiencies are
working cooperatively
within a community
When this occurs. there is a prospect for ar
ever-increasing spirit of innovation thro'ughou'
the industry. The loc::11 plastics industry ir
Northem Worcester County (MAj, for example
has caught this spirit and moved from chea~
plastic forks and spoons to high-tech 'sur
screening' night goggles ror helicopter pilot1
operating in desert conditions.
The third clement centres on 'Related ane

logical advancement. She argues, however, that
spatial clustering alone docs not create mutually beneficial interdependencies.
There is a
need for the complex of institutional and social
relationships that connect the prodUt:ers within
a region's fragmented industrial structure. Bennett Harrison. in supporting the theory of clusters, argues that agglomer:llions of small- and
medium-sized companies alone will nO! create
significant success. There is J need for bigger

Supporting Industries'. When foreign or inter·
national suppliers have been globally tested
they will incvitably help domeslic end-produce:
companies improve their products and scrvices
Typically. they will have prospered in the
world market hy upgrading and improving pro
duction techniques.
processes and outputs
They can then bring their entrepreneurial cui
lure to the domestic firms. where a highe:
degree of L'ompetitivcness can emerge througf
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mutually desired innovation, the transfer of
information and a close working relationship.
Porter maintains that there is a decided advantage when the suppliers and end producers are
located in the same area: new ideas are tested
more easily, informal learning results and news
of the marketplace is shared. The integrating
factor in Porter's Diamond is the fourth and
final element: 'Firm Strategy, Structure and
Rivalry'. Most companies do not define their
strategies in a comprehensive manner. National
industry leaders more commonly develop strategic plans based on the best analysis of world
markets and trends, and the strengths and weaknesses of their competition. Small companies
do not generally possess the economies of scale
necessary to undertake such comprehensive
strategic plans, however. Among smaller firms.
strategic planning is often informal, inductive,
reactive and too frequently lives only in the
head of the chief executive officer.
Company structure is also an important component of Porter's fourth element. Experience
shows that sole proprietorships with local roots
tend to stay in their present locations even if
market advantages can be found elsewhere.
However,
family-owned
businesses
change
over time and the commitment to place diminishes as older generations retire. For planners
and local officials interested in attracting and
retaining businesses. corporate structure can be
an important indicator of corporate stability. If
lines of succession are unclear, if mergers are
in the wind, or if the existing location's attractiveness wanes, then a company would appear
to be in danger of relocating.
When rivalry among competitors, suppliers
and customers exists there is continual improvement in product quality and an upgrading
of labour. This is demonstrated in the more
than 20 paper companies within 10 miles of
Holyoke, Massachusetts ('The Paper City'), the
30 plastics companies within 10 miles of
Leominster, Massachusetts ('The Pioneer Plastics City') and the hundreds of high-technology
companies within ]0 miles of Route 128
(' America's
Technology
Highway').
Local
rivalry with mutual cooperation can result in an
environment
that has a strong competitive
advantage, where change is viewed as an
opportunity.

Organisations can help foster this spirit in the
presence of company rivalries. A government
'Iabcratory' created such a spirit in the case of
North Carolina's
Research
Triangle
Park
(Lugar & Goldstein, 1992). The presence of a
strong university can foster the same spirit. The
spin-off companies from Stanford, Duke, MTT
and the University of Texas, among others,
provide examples of how this can happen
(Dertouzos el aI., 1989). A single university
department can also help to stimulate this spirit,
as in the case of the University of Massachusetts Polymer Studies Department.
Another
organisational structure, perhaps less widely
recognised, is an industry network. Networks in
the paper, plastics and granite industries have
been quite effective. On the other hand, these
networks can become overly protective and
may focus on 'fighting the last war' rather than
on fostering a spirit of healthy competition in
the presence of industrial change.
Industrial clustering does not occur spontaneously. There must be companies within an
industry that compete against each other, sophisticated suppliers that co-exist with local
firms, companies whose strategic plans define
their competition in a global framework, and a
desire for improvement.

Barre,

Vermont,

The Granite

Capital

The City of Barre, population 9482, is located
in central Vermont between Montpelier and
White River Junction. approximately] 30 miles
from Montreal, Canada. and 200 miles from
Boston. Massachusetts (see Figure ]). First settled in 1769, it quickly became known for its
vast quantities of granite. By the late nineteenth
century, Barre had become known as the granite capital of the world. Although the claim is
somewhat of an overstatement. the city sits on
one of the most extensive granite deposits on
the globe. Geologists estimate that the deposit
is four miles long, two miles wide and ten
miles deep.
The granite industry is the largest industrial
sector in Barre. There are approximately 60
granite companies located in the Barre area.
They employ approximately 1000 workers with
an additional 400 workers supplying transportation, machinery or equipment repair services.
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FIGURE

I. The location of Barre. Vermont.

The value of the products manufactured in
Barre is estimated at approximately
S I 00
million per year. Approximately
47%' of
this represents the cost of materials, while
53% represents 'value added'. This relatively
low percentage of value added reflects a reluctance by companies to invest in high technology or to take efforts to improve worker
productivity.
The workforce is predominantly blue collar
but very well paid by Vermont standards. Indeed, among manufacturing occupations. only
the ele.ctrical workers in Vermont earn a higher
hourly wage. Most of the workers own their
own homes. Moreover, Barre has virtually no
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major crime and contains some of the most
spectacular natural resources in the nation.
There is little turnover in personnel in the
granite industry, and sons have followed fathers
into the quarries for generations. Based on
citizen surveys and focus sessions. there are no
obvious signs of a widespread desire among
residents to broaden the city's industrial or
occupational base.

The State of Barre's

Industry

Changes in the granite industry are sending
signs of foreboding over Barre and its industry.

Planning an Industrial Cluster
Although Barre's finns have carved out a
strong market niche, granite sales are in a
gradual decline and new quarries are being
developed across the United States. In fact, by
tons of rock cut and shipped, quarries in Elberton, Georgia now out-produce those found in
Barre. The Barre industry has long speciaJised
in rough-cut stone and grave markers. Approximately 90-95% of Barre's production is memorials and monuments.
There are clear signs that the granite industry
as a whole has not adapted to changing market
conditions. American builders are increasingly
moving away from the use of granite as a
buiJding materia]; one reason for this may be
that the industry has faiJed to standardise its
cutting procedures like the brick, marble and
concrete industries. The industry has also failed
to 'add value' to its product. The marble industry has done far more to modernise than the
granite industry and could serve as a model.
Neither the Rock of Ages Company, the leading granite company in Barre, nor the Barre
Granite Association
(BGA), has made any
noteworthy attempts to add value to their product.
The Rock of Ages Company is the prime
example of the industry's shortcomings. Rock
of Ages has six quarries in Barre alone and
many more across the Northeast. Because the
company is based in nearby New Hampshire, it
functions as an absentee owner. In its constant
quest to hold down costs and compete in the
industry, Rock of Ages' business strategy
makes it more like a multinational corporation
than a home-grown finn. The company chooses
its rock-cutting and selling sites, in part, with
an eye toward achieving economies of scale.
The company's freedom to choose where it cuts
rock means that Rock of Ages does not need
Barre as much as Barre needs Rock of Ages.
To date, the company has served as a 'good
citizen'. It participates in community events. is
an active member of the BGA. and operates the
Barre Granite Industries' Visitors' Ce:nre. This
s.upplements its inordinate impact on the local
economy.
A key factor that could influence the furore
of Barre's granite industry is increasing international competition. Under the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), all tariffs on granite will

eventually be removed. Already, granite from
as far away as India is quarried, cut, finished,
polished and shipped to the US at a lower cost
than a similar product can be supplied by
Barre's companies. There are other nations,
such as Italy and Spain, that also have a ready
supply of the material and low extraction costs.
Considering the slipping domestic demand
for granite, the powerful position of Rock of
Ages within Barre's industry, and growing international competition, Barre's granite industry has cause for concern. This led officials and
some industry leaders in Barre to consider how
industrial clustering could help.

The Potential
for
Cluster in Barre

Planning

an

Industrial

From the start of this project, the mayor and
town manager saw the need for change far
more dearly than did the granite industry. The
local governmental leadership knew that the
industry was not growing, wages were flat and
Barre's market share was eroding, It clearly
needed to stimulate change, but had little experience, in planning for economic development. After looking at many approaches, the
leadership felt quite comfortable in using the
industrial clustering concept as a means of
detennining
the state of Barre's industries,
identifying weaknesses and providing a focus
for potential municipal actions, Tne results are
explained below,
Although the local government had come to
recognise the need for change in its relations
with the granite industry, its past record in
providing
Porter's
Factor Conditions
was
mixed. Its role was primarily as a provider and
guarantor of a social safety net for its citizens.
In other words, economic planning and assistance were not of primary importance. The city
had put together a 'Stone Trades' programme at
the high school that regularly prepared 10
workers per year for the industry. but had no
initiatives at the more significant university
I~vel. (Vermont's universities and colleges do
~ot have a tradition of direct outreach.)
After reviewing the impact of their orientation with the consulting team. local government officials came to see that they could play
an interventionary role in stimulating growth
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within their industrial base, and create a balance between providing a social safety net and
supporting local companies. The shift in attitude was marked by. modest but noteworthy
initiatives. Zoning was quickly altered to meet
companies' expansion plans, ideas were generated for the establishment of a granite museum
in the city, and local officials helped write
legislation to require the use of granite in all
Vermont public buildings. The shift was also
evident in the search for financial assistance.

dards, they argued that those developments
irrelevant.

arf

Porter's
capstone point, 'Firm Strategy.
Structure and Rivalry', points to another weak
spot in Barre's industry: formal planning i>
rare. Companies' strategic plans are developed
through informal processes, often determined
by the gut instincts of company executives, In
the absence of significant changes in the industry, the firms on the whole have performed
quite well. But if change is coming to the
industry, as even local government officials
have recognised. then more formal processes of
strategic planning are needed to deal with the
increasing complexity of the industry.
There is a great deal of rivalry in Barre's
granite industry, but as the dominant firm in
Barre and one of the leading granite companies
in the US, Rock of Ages sets the tone. It has
name recognition, a formal corporate structure,
and a dearer sense of world trends than the

For years the Central Vermont Economic Development Corporation had a small revolving
loan fund (RLF) sponsored by the US Economic Development Administration (EDA), but
it had gone unnoticed by most Barre officials.
After the study was completed, however, the
leadership became active in obtaining more
resources from the fund. They are also now
detcrmined to be active players in the EDArequired Overall Economic Development Prosmaller firms. Rock of Ages' hegemony pergramme (OEDP). Local government now at
haps provides the best explanation of the resistleast considers the improvement of the granite
ance in Barre to the adoption of a clustering
business as being within its realm of responsistrategy. Rock of Ages sees Barre as only a
biJities.
point of supply for the granite they need. The
However, Barre's 'hard-rock' resistance to
. company strategy appears to be to extract the
change is perhaps best illustrated by the unwillrock at the lowest possible cost. thereby mainingness of the granite industry to provide
taining their dominant position in the industry.
Porter's second critical element of industrial
An industrial cluster would necessarily require
dusters:
meeting the level of demand for
the formation of a new, more aggressive trade
product and keeping up with product buyers'
association (which Rock of Ages would pay a
increasing sophistication. Barre's granite commajority of the funds to support) and the enpanies have been slow to innovate. reluctant to
trance of granite competitors to the Barre remarket new products, and unwilling to adjust to
gion. Both of these developments would work
a changing industry. The skills. tools and maragainst the company's goals. In addition. comket exist for Barre to become a duster where
pany management does not tive in the city and
the demands for improved products and greater
therefore would not benefit personally from
competition stimulate 'value-added'
product
further economic development.
development. However, the BGA and the chief
A number of the basic components for an
executive officers of many granite companies
industrial cluster are present in Barre. Barre's
tend to see Barre's primary business as moving
natural granite resources are by all measures
rock and cutting grave stones.
immense and demand has been healthy. Thcre
Suppliers to Ba,rre's granite industry have
are still impediments to creating a truly commade little effort to become globally compepetitive environment. Barre's inability to detitive. Employers and business owners were
velop its granite businesses into a. special
surveyed by the consulting team, and when- industrial duster is due in large part to a rather
asked about the int'iuence of WTO or NAFT A
feeble trade association, an increasingly outthey initially argued. like the industry itself.
dated market orientation, a lack of commitment
that these agrcements will hurt Barre. When
to 'value-added' products, a reluctancc to comasked about the int'iuence of the European
pcte in the world marketplace. and inadequate
Union or the need to follow international stanassistance from government.
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Lessons Learned
In trying to apply Porter's model to Barre, we
identified several points that either receive inadequate attention in his approach or present
interesting complications
not explicitly addressed by Porter. These issues should be of
interest to economic and industrial planners
who are also interested in applying the model.
The two main issues have to do with the role of
government intervention and the role of the
granite industry.
The role of governmental
intervention is
critical to producing Porter's Factor Conditions.
Local government leadership can indeed become more interventionist, but that government
intervention by itself is not enough to reverse
the situation. After focusing on alternative approaches, the administration determined that it
could help the local industrial base in several
ways. First, it was to ensure that government
did not serve as an impediment to growth.
Thus, the public leadership made sure that the
necessary water, sewer and other infrastructure
capacity was in place. Second, the government
officials were very sensitive to the industry's
need for favourable tax policies. Local property
taxes were kept low. Further, the city administrator, as well as Barre's state senators and state
representatives,
worked to keep workmen's
compensation
and unemployment" insurance
costs as low as possible. Third, the city was
more than willing to use public funds to find
new industrial sites so the granite companies
could expand within the city boundaries.
Finally, its education and banking institutions
were oriented, as much as possible, to meet the
needs of the industry.
In order to have a significant impact. the role
of government must be clearly defined and
carried out consistently over an extended period
of time. Equally important, local government
must know its limits. It cannot directly change
federal policy, intervene in business operations
or predict world events. In Barre, local government eventually came to recognise its role in
nurturing the city's granite industry.
However, the necessary changes were not
forthcoming in the granite industry. Not all
companies strive for increased growth. If a
company is making a high return on its invest-

ments, has little debt, and can see a solid
demand for its product, it may well continue
to operate as it is. The presence of a competitive advantage will not, by itself, result in an
automatic willingness to take on risk. As long
as the owners are making a solid return on
investment and the immediate future appears
secure, they will continue to operate as they
have in the past. There are many such companies in Barre.
Other important lessons of the Barre experience are noted below.
• The presence of the elements of an industrial
cluster does not lead automatically
to increased competitiveness. In the case of Barre,
severa! elements were in place, but there was
no catalyst to precipitate
the necessary
change in attitude within the granite industry.
• The dominance of one company in a local
cluster contributes to a climate of uncertainty. There is never 'perfect equilibrium' in
any industrial cl uster.
• While the role of government is understood,
industrial assistance programmes
are still
viewed with great scepticism. They are perceived as overly complicated, too intrusive
and coming with too many strings attached.
In the Barre case, the granite industry held to
the old adage that government governs best
when it governs least.
• Industrial associations can be instrumental in
either promoting industrial clusters or impeding their development. They often reflect
the wishes of the larger members of the
organisation rather than the view of the majority. In order to promote clusters, associations need to lead their industries rather than
follow them.
• Developing local points of pride is important.
. Boosterism, statues (Figure 2), museums and
festivals can help to create a sense of pride
and create a bond between the citizens and the
industry. They may have little direct impact
on the bottom line but can have a great impact
on corporate and community morale ..
• Industries need to establish better links with
institutions ot" higher education. There appears to be little understanding in Barre's
local government of how to bring together
educational institutions to support an industrial cluster. Despite the best effoI1s of the
~17
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2. The Stonecutter"s Monument. Main Street. Barre. Vermont.

vocational school. the community colIege
and the Private Industries Council (PIC). the
results in Barre are unsatisfactory. The granite industry. like most other industries in the
US. wants entry-level workers with good
basic skills. The firms will train them in the
particular company-established
methods: the
industry has a substantial lack of confidence
in higher education.
• The creation of an industrial cluster in Barre
requires a change in the industI"}'s culture.
Such a change has not occurred. The potential exists to move toward higher value-added
businesses. such as from extraction to cutting
to standardisation to speciality marketing to
retail goods. Such changes. however. do not
occur overnight. and the trip from a Barre
quarry to a Manhattan designer"s studio can
be a long one indeed. A. crucial lesson of the
Barre experience .is that industrial clusters
have to evolve over time.
• There is no set formula for creating an
industrial cluster. It must be grounded by
an institution. natural resources. or a core
company in order to emerge. But beyond
those preconditions.
the process of industrial cluster formation remains somewhat
iII-defined.
We realise that a single case offers only a
snapshot ofa community and its industry at one
moment in time. However. if the findings are
similar in other communities endeavouring to

develop clusters. then there is reason to shift
our focus decisively from the other factors in
the. Porter model toward the leadership environment.
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